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STUDENT NOTES
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY IN NEGLIGENCE CASES
Though negligence is generally said to be lack of ordinary care
under the circumstances, an abstract definition of the term by the
trial court is not necessary unless it is requested.2 Since, however,
abstract legal concepts mean little to the average layman, and con-
sequently to the average juror, it is desirable that the court point out
the constituent elements of ordinary care which are involved in the
case before it. In so doing, it can lessen the amount of speculation
in which members of the jury would indulge if presented with an
abstruse formula.
In many cases the court may say as a matter of law that reason-
able care requires that a certain thing be done.3 Whether in a particu-
lar case it is warranted in so instructing the jury depends upon whether
the facts are such as to justify only one inference, one on which reason-
able men could not differ.4 A good illustration may be found in the
'The classic definition is found in Heaven v. Pender (1883) 11
Q. B. D. 503, 507: "Actionable negligence consists in the neglect of the
use of ordinary care or skill towards a person to whom the defendant
owes the duty of observing ordinary care and skill, by which neglect
the plaintiff . . . has suffered injury to his person or property."
-Western Union Tel. Co. v. Engler, 75 Fed. 102 (1896); Savannah
Elec. Co. v. Joseph, 25 Ga. App. 518, 103 S. E. 723 (1920); Duvall v.
Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 275 S. W. 586 (Mo. App. 1925).
-Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Lynch, 43 Ind. App. 177, 87
N. E. 40 (1909) (Railroad company required to give timely warning of
approach of its locomotive when approaching street crossing "whether
or not there was a statute requiring signals to be given . . .");
Fisher v. O'Brien, 99 Kans. 621, 162 Pac. 317 (1917) ("Independently
of any statute, it is neglegence as a matter of law to drive an auto-
mobile along the highway on a dark night at such speed that it cannot
be stopped within the distance that objects can be seen ahead of it.");
Ruffin v. Atlantic & N. C. R. Co., 142 N. C. 120, 55 S. E. 86 (1906)
(failure of carrier to have sufficient light on its wharf entitled passenger
to recovery for injury during landing). But see Savanah, F. & W. R. Co.
v. Evans, 115 Ga. 315, 41 S. E. 631 (1902) ("In the trial of an action in a
court of this state for a negligent tort, it is error for the court to tell
the jury what facts do or do not constitute negligence, unless there is a
statute or valid municipal ordinance which in term or in effect declares
the act referred to be negligence.")
'Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Thrift Co., 63 Ind. App. 198, 116 N. E. 756
(1917). "If, however, the only reasonable inference from such facts
is that they do constitute negligence, then an instruction, that if they
are believed to exist the verdict must be for plaintiff, is not objection-
able." 45 Corpus Juris 1341, see. 916. If reasonable men might fairly
differ as to whether there was negligence, the determination of the
question is for the jury. See Grand Trunk R. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408,
416, 12 S. Ct. 679 (1891); Gallagher v. Great Northern R. Co., 55 N. D.
211, 212 N. W. 839, 840-41 (1927).
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case of Davis v. Margolis,5 where it appeared that the driver of an auto-
mobile had proceeded across a railroad in front, of an approaching
train, acting upon the assurance of other persons in the car that the
way was clear. The driver was held guilty of negligence as a matter
of law, the court saying that had he been keeping a reasonably careful
lookout he would have seen the flashing of the red signal light in time
to stop6
In a much greater number of cases, the facts are not sufficiently
clear for the court to say as a matter of law that certain acts do or do
not constitute negligence. In such a case, it becomes the province of
the jury, acting under proper instructions from the court, to determine
the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the defendant's conduct.
The trend in recent years has been to require that the trial court's
instructions apply specifically to the facts of the ease presented7 An
example might be a case in which a business guest had been injured
by slipping upon a piece of soap in a dimly lighted hallway. The
instruction should then be somewhat as follows:
Gentlemen of the Jury:
If you believe from the evidence that the corridor through
which the plaintiff was required to pass on the way to his office was
dark and unlighted, so that he could not by the exercise of ordinary
care see where he was walking, that at the time and place of injury
plaintiff stepped upon a piece of soap left upon the floor by defend-
ant's servants or employees, that defendant by the exercise of ordi-
nary care could have prevented the piece of soap from being on the
floor of the corridor at the said time and place, that such failure
on the part of defendant was negligence, and that, as a direct result
of defendant's failure to have removed the piece of soap from the
floor thereof, plaintiff, while in the exercise of ordinary care for
his own safety, stepped upon the piece of soap and fell and was
injured, then defendant is liable to plaintiff and you should so
find.8
Regardless of how concrete such an instruction may be, however,
where a party's negligence is a question of fact the jury exercises a
wide discretion not subject to the control of the court. It is true they
are instructed that the care of the "man of ordinary prudence under
the circumstances" must have been used, but "ordinary care" may not
be explained as the care of any particular individual or group,' nor
5 107 Conn. 417, 140 Atl. 823 (1928).
6 Id. at 825.
TLouisville & N. R. Co. v. King's Adm'r., 131 Ky. 347, 115 S. W. 196,
198 (1909). (Case was reversed for failure to give a requested instruc-
tion on facts which, if true, would constitute contributory negligence.
The instruction given by the trial court on contributory negligence was
said to be abstractly correct but too general in form. It left to the jury,
without any definite directions for their guidance, the determination of
what constituted contributory negligence.)
8 See Petera v. Railway Exchange Bldg., 42 S. W. (2d) 947 at 949
(Mo. 1931).
"In Reynolds v. City of Burlington, 52 Vt. 300 (1880), the trial
court had charged that plaintiff could not recover if want of ordinary
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may the "ordinary prudent man" be compared with any real person
or described as possessing any other particular qualities or combina-
tion of qualities."O The phrase "under the circumstances" is employed,
says Professor Green," "as a blanket for every pertinent factor, and the
courts seldom undertake to enumerate these factors."" (Italics added.)
Despite the fact that courts seldom undertake to enumerate factors
that may be considered among the "circumstances", there is a need for
a classification of those that may be mentioned (pursuant to the neces-
sity of having an instruction apply specifically to the facts in the case).
The subjective factors, i.e., the physical and mental traits and
conditions, peculiar to the actor, have been treated at length by a
number of writers.- But no attempt has been made to classify objec-
tive factors. There is at present a regrettable variance in instructions
given by different trial courts on cases involving much the same facts
and issues. It is desirable that both the plaintiff and the defendant in
a negligence case be able to know in advance those facts to which refer-
ence may be made by the court in its charge.
Any classification attempted to be drawn from the cases will neces-
sarily be incomplete, and dependent to a great degree upon analogy.
care on his part contributed to the injury, and further charged that the
expression "ordinary care" excluded "extraordinary care" and "care-
lessness"; that plaintiff was bound to exercise a mean degree of care,
"that measure of care and attention . . . that persons of ordinary
care, men generally, ordinary prudent men" exercise under similar
circumstances; and that, if plaintiff "did what any ordinary man, any
man of ordinary care and attention would have done," was "exercising
such a measure of care as men ordinarily would have exercised," he
had satisfied the rule. The charge was held erroneous, the court
indulging in hair-splitting distinctions to maintain the symmetry of its
formula by saying, "The care and prudence which the law regards as
'ordinary' is such as prudent men are accustomed to exercise on like
occasions,-not such 'as men generally' . . . not 'what a man of
ordinary care would have done, riding as plaintiff was' .
'-'Green, The Negligence Issue (1928) 37 Yale L. 3. 1029, 1035. This
fact is illustrated in the case of Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Gower, 85
Tenn. 465, 3 S. W. 824 (1887), in which the plaintiff was injured while
coupling cars on defendant's road, he being in discharge of his duties
as brakeman. It was held error to instruct that "it was the duty of the
plaintiff to exercise such a degree of care in making the coupling as a
man of ordinary prudence would have done", with the additional expla-
nation: "Just such care as one of you, similarly employed, would have
exercised under such circumstances." (Italics added) The limitation
defining due care was said by the court to be incorrect.
n Green, supra, note 10, at 1037.
"He goes on to say: "Under this phrase, the 'ordinary prudent
person' may be endowed if necessary with the very qualities of the party
whose conduct is to be measured. If the party is blind, crippled, deaf,
small, strong, nervous, experienced, aged, intelligent, stupid, or what-
not, this is but one of the circumstances under which the 'ordinary
prudent person' must act." Ibid.
"I'Green, supra note 10; Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence, and
Indifference; The Relation of Mental States to Negligence (1926) 39
Harv. L. Rev. 849; Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective? (1927)
41 Harv. L. Rev. 1.
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However, broad divisions are evident, and other circumstances not
listed herein may be added as occasion demands.
1. Instrumentalities.
The practice of referring in the instructions to the agency by which
the injury is produced is so general and so well established that it
appears to be beyond question.4 It is a necessary and desirable adjunct
to the modern requirement that an instruction relate specifically, rather
than in the abstract, to the facts of the case.
2. Locale.
The place where an injury occurrs is such a vital part of the deter-
mination of whether the person causing the injury was negligent that
its consideration should always be impressed upon the jury. A due
regard for the necessity of phrasing an instruction so that it applies
specifically to the facts involved would require that the jury be told
to consider the acts of the parties in light of the fact that they tran-
spired at a particular place (or else a particular type of location, as,
crowded thoroughfare, remote railroad crossing, busy lumber yard,
etc.)."
3. External Conditions Affecting Hniman Behavior.
Weather conditions frequently play an important role in the evalua-
tion of conduct. Such factors as rain, snow, sleet, fog, extreme cold,
extreme heat, and excessive wind, which would tend to affect materially
the behavior of an individual, or that of any agency which the accused
had assumed to control, may be so vital to a proper determination of
the question of negligence that the accused is entitled to have an
instruction refer specifically to those present in his case.,3
14 Barrett Co. v. Bobal, 74 F. (2d) 406, 408 (1935) (faculty screw
plug in oil tank safety valve); Haverty Furniture Co. v. Jewell, 38 Ga.
App. 395, 144 S. E. 46, 47 (1928) (oil on linoleum); Anderson v. Chicago
Great Western R. Co., 71 S. W. (2d) 508 (Mo. App. 1934) (heavy car
wheels); Mick v. John R. Thompson Co., 77 S. W. (2d) 470 (Mo. App.
1934) (pair of scales in passageway).
See, for example, East Tenn. & Ga. R. Co. v. St. John, 37 Tenn.
(5 Sneed) 273 (1858) (court approved the following instruction:
". if the injury was occasioned by running the cars at too
great speed, at that particular point on the road, that would be such
negligence as would render the defendants liable in damages . )
(Italics added.)
"In determinIng whether a traveler, in the exercise of ordinary
care, might fail to discover the approach of a train, it is obvious that
the question whether the view of the track from the highway is open
or obstructed is of prime importance." Jones v. Boston & M. R. R., 139
Atl. 214, 216 (N. H. 1927).
I0 See Riley v. Motor Express, Inc., 193 Ark. 780, 102 S. W. (2d) 850
(1937) (stalled motor truck struck by passing car; foggy, early morn-
ing); D'Wolf v. Stix-Baer & Fuller Dry Goods Co., 273 S. W. 172 (Mo.
App. 1925) (automobile collision on rainy night); Woodley v. Steiner,
164 S. E. 294 (W. Va. 1932) (automobile collision caused by skidding
on snowy pavement).
STUDENT NoTEs 473
Closely related, though not in the same class, are such elements as
darkness, glare of headlights, glare of sunlight, etc. It is a recognized
fact that the presence of any one or combination of these factors has a
decided bearing on the question of whether the accused person acted
with reasonable care." That being the case, it is the duty of the court
to indicate the legal effect of the presence of such factor at the request
of either litigant.
The existence of an emergency situation, another factor in the light
of which the conduct of the actor must be judged, requires reference in
the court's instructions. Though the standard of conduct does not vary
In such a case,8 the fact that the accused acted in the face of an emer-
gency is an illuminating element in an evaluation of his conduct."
By way of summary it may be said that according to the modern
view, instructions in negligence cases must include more than a mere
abstract definition of negligence. Wherever possible, the trial court
should inform the jury as to what acts of which the defendant is
accused or which the evidence tends to establish amount to negligence.
Such acts would be those about which reasonable men could not differ.
When the court cannot say that certain acts of the defendant constitute
negligence as a matter of law, it should instruct the jury on the care
required, with specific reference to the conduct of the defendant at the
time the injury occurred.
The fact that the jury frequently takes into consideration factors
never referred to in the instructions is well recognized.- Which of
these factors may and which may not be made the subject of an instruc-
tion is another matter. It is submitted that any fact allowed to be
established under the rules of evidence may be mentioned in the instruc-
tion, if reasonably pertinent to the issue, subject to the limitation that
no particular part of the evidence may be unduly emphasized at the
expense of another. -' A classification of cases indicates that reference
to instrumentalities, physical surroundings, and weather conditions
may always be made in the instructions, provided that such factors
have a reasonable bearing upon the evaluation of the conduct in
question.
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"7 See Budnick v. Peterson, 215 Mich. 678, 184 N. W. 493 (1921)
(court said that if the vision of an automobile driver is obscured by the
glaring lights of an approaching car, it is his duty to so slacken the
speed of his car that he might stop it immediately if necessary); Meads
v. Deener, 128 Cal. App. 328, 17 P. (2d) 198 (1933) (driving at rate of
25 miles per hour blinded by sunlight was sufficient to sustain finding
of negligence); Harkins v. Somerset Bus Co., 308 Pa 109, 162 Atl. 163
(1932) (motorbus, stalled at night on highway, was struck by a pass-
Ing car).
21 See Jones v. Boston & M. R. R., 139 Atl. 214 (N. H. 1927), at 221.
"'See Terry, Negligence (1915) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 40, at 49.
" See Green, supra note 10, at 1044.
21 Id. at 1045-46.
